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Abstract
We investigate the general equilibrium effects of minimum con-
sumption constraints over labor supply decisions. Within a simple
static model, a minimum consumption constraint modifies labor sup-
ply decisions of unskilled workers, generating the well-known added
worker effect. The results of the model help to analyze the Turkish
labor market where added worker effects were observed following the
2001 crisis. We investigate the asymmetric effects of the crisis, using
the Household Budget Surveys that cover the period between 2002 and
2005. The substantial decrease in real wages has increased labor supply
for unskilled labor, especially for women.
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1 Introduction
The crisis that began in 2007 in a small segment of the US financial markets,
the subprime sector, quickly evolved into a financial crisis and into a global
recession. Developing and emerging countries, whose financial sectors were
not significantly involved in the wave of financial innovation that eventually
led to the crisis, were hit very hard through the reduction in world trade and
the turbulence in financial markets. Three year into the crisis, we observe
that the recession is leading to very important social consequences, with
mounting (and most probably long lasting) unemployment and increasing
pressure on wages. These problems are likely to be harsher in emerging and
developing countries, whose system of social safety nets is insufficiently de-
veloped. The question of how labor markets react to economic fluctuations
has been central to the economics literature. Typically, in a general equilib-
rium setting, the supply side of labor market has been treated as uniform and
limited to the (possibly intertemporal) choice of resource allocation between
consumption and leisure. Nevertheless, empirical studies on labor supply be-
havior are rich and document various factors affecting households’ decisions
to participate into labor market. In particular, two phenomena have been
extensively studied in the empirical literature. The first, the added worker
effect, asserts that inactive members of the households move into the labor
force to compensate household income loss incurring from unemployment
and/or considerable wage cuts. This effect is most often found in develop-
ing economies. The second, the discouraged worker effect runs the opposite
way, as workers that are discouraged from unemployment and prolonged pe-
riods of job search, leave the workforce. Which effect dominates became the
subject of considerable empirical investigation and debate (Mincer, 1962;
Belton and Rhodes, 1976; Ashenfelter, 1980; Layard, Barton and Zabalza,
1980; Bardhan, 1984; Lundberg, 1985 and Maloney, 1987, 1991). Additional
labor force participation is usually found to come from secondary (spousal)
workers in the household, and frequently in empirical studies the push fac-
tor is the job loss of the head of the household. In downturns, increased
household labor supply serves as a source of household income when access
to credit is limited and formal insurance mechanisms such as unemployment
benefits are weak. Since the institutional structure of labor market regula-
tions and the strength of safety nets vary across countries, the methodologies
and findings of the empirical studies also vary.1 In this paper, we will focus
merely on the added worker effect hypothesis; we emphasize as a push factor
the income loss (real wage reduction) of the household head and the (risk
of) job loss. In fact, the income loss factor (considerable wage cut of the
head of household) has been mentioned but generally not investigated in
1Cullen and Gruber (2000) argue that these mixed findings may be explained by the
‘crowding out’ effects of unemployment insurance schemes, that supporting the household
level of income may keep the secondary members out of the labor market in short term.
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depth by theoretical and empirical work alike 2.
As it is well known, the degree of wage rigidity may be a crucial ele-
ment in determining the relative strength of income loss and job loss factors
during a crisis. Labor market institutions thus play a key role in wage and
unemployment adjustment mechanisms.
We develop a simple static toy model embedding these features of la-
bor supply; we introduce skill heterogeneity, and we investigate the effect of
minimum consumption constraints over labor supply decisions of unskilled
workers. When the economy is hit by a negative shock -in this case on
technology- the minimum consumption constraint modifies the labor sup-
ply decisions of unskilled workers facing wage income loss, and the general
equilibrium outcome of the model. This type of added worker effect leads to
a countercyclical wage gap, that results from asymmetric effects of produc-
tivity shocks over the labor-consumption decisions of unskilled and skilled
workers. We also introduce a simple redistributive policy by wage taxa-
tion/subsidies to investigate whether there is room for government policy in
order to compensate the welfare effects of negative shocks.
The crisis of 2001 led to a widely documented added worker effect in
Turkey3. The substantial decrease of real wages increased labor supply for
unskilled labor, especially women. The severity of real wages decline for
unskilled workers, compared to earlier crises as the one of 1994, yielded a
much more significant added worker effect. The recovery of the economy
was rather quick but, because of the pressure on wages, the added worker
effect persisted until the year 2003. The original contribution of our research
is to investigate the asymmetric effects of the 2001 crisis, and to identify the
relative weight of job loss and wage loss as push factors. This is particu-
larly important to form an anticipation of future developments linked to the
current crisis, and to design the proper policy responses.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses some stylized facts
that point to a strong added worker effect following the Turkish crisis of
2001, and reviews the related empirical literature. Then, in section 3 we
introduce a simple static model with skill heterogeneity and wage taxa-
tion, showing that the introduction of minimum consumption constraints
is enough to produce a decreasing labor supply for low skilled workers; de-
pending on institutional conditions, the added worker effect may stem from
increased unemployment or from reduced wage. Aggregated stylized facts
are insufficient to capture the complexity inherent to labor supply decisions.
Section 4 discusses therefore the asymmetric effects of added worker and
empirical evidence of countercyclical wage gap for Turkey, using the House-
hold Budget Surveys that cover the period between 2000 and 2006. The
2Maloney (1987) underlines that the underemployment of the husband has a substantial
impact on the labor supply of the wife. This indirectly supports the fact that income loss
due to underemployment leads to some labor reallocation within the household.
3See Gursel and Levent (2003) and Kızılırmak (2005) who also survey other work.
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last section draws some parallels between the crisis of 2001 and the one of
2008-2009, and proposes topics for further research.
2 The Turkish Crisis of 2001 and the Added Worker
Effect
The scope of this section is not to describe in detail the Turkish labor market,
but to outline some stylized facts on the wage adjustment mechanism and
to bring forth the transitory added worker effect which emerged after the
2001 crisis.
Following a decade of financial liberalization begun in the early 1980s
(Rodrik, 1990), the Turkish economy has undergone several financial crises.
In particular, the exchange rate crises of 1994 and 2001 have triggered severe
banking crises and amplified the imbalances inherent to the economy. The
international economics literature has extensively documented the propagat-
ing effects of these twin (current account and banking) crises when countries
also suffer from chronic inflation, high level of dollarization, substantial pro-
cyclical current account deficits and unsustainable fiscal deficits (Calvo and
Vegh, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Turkey falls into this category
like many Latin American countries. But the Turkish case is peculiar in
the sense that during two decades of chronic high inflation, the low nominal
wage indexation prevented a possible wage-price spiral (preventing hyperin-
flation), and thus prevented the collapse of the monetary system (Yilmaz,
2000). Nevertheless, lacking nominal indexation, real wages during the last
two decade were eroded.
Figure 1 shows the path of real wages, productivity and GDP since the
late 1980s. During the 1990s real wages in Turkey followed rather closely
the economic cycle, even if overshooting. Following the April 1994 crisis,
they declined rapidly due to low indexation (Shiller, 1997; Celasun and
McGettigan, 2004) and to the tension in the labor market. They then gained
ground with the rapid recovery of the economy but with the after effects of
the Russian crisis and of the earthquake of 1999, they nearly came to the level
of 1994. Overall, the growth of wages over the decade of the 1990s was in line
with real GDP. The twin crisis in February 2001 marked the beginning of
decoupling. It led to the rapid fall of real wages to unprecedented levels, were
they stagnated even during the recovery that began in 2002. The lagging
behind of wages is even more evident if we look at productivity growth. The
lack of available data at household level prevents further considerations over
the wage dispersion in 2001. But anedoctical evidence induces to think that
the lower skilled -and less unionized4- segment of labor supply faced either
4 According to the 2002 Household Surveys, Only 4 percent of private sector employ-
ees are union members, compared to 28 percent in public enterprises and 51 percent in
government. Moreover, even among active trade union members, only about 700,000 are
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Figure 1: Real wage adjustment (black continuous), labor productivity (light
continuous) and GDP growth (dashed) indexes, four quarter moving aver-
ages (1988Q1=1).
layoffs, or dramatic real wage reductions.
The high responsiveness of real wages to economic conditions conflicts
with the findings on the legal regulations and prevailing employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL) regime, by which Turkey is placed among the
economies with less flexible labor markets5. As Taymaz and Ozler (2003)
underline, the observed dynamics of labor markets and the alleged inflex-
ibility of regulatory and institutional frame do not match. The figures on
unemployment duration and inflow into unemployment are not consistent
with the EPL ranking of Turkey. This can probably be explained by the fact
that the coexistence of wage flexibility and strict EPL regimes tends to lead
to the informalization of labor contracts (see World Bank, 2006; chapter 4).
At any rate, what is relevant for this paper is that the real wage adjustment
provides evidence that because of the crisis, wage earners faced remarkable
income losses.
The effect of unemployment and income losses has been the increase of
labor force participation for secondary (spousal) workers. Several studies
(Gursel and Levent, 2003; Kızılırmak, 2005) document that following the
2001 crisis, the added worker effect appears for female urban workers, van-
ishing as the economy begins to recover: starting from 2004, real wages have
increased, albeit very slowly if compared with GDP or productivity (figure
covered by a collective agreement (World Bank, 2006).
5See the OECD EPL index, introduced by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999).
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1).6
Urban and rural participation rates for women show some dissimilarities:
the latter are higher for the reason that rural work needs some household
labor sharing. This peculiarity of agricultural labor markets explains why
added worker effects are usually observed on urban labor markets alone, and
justifies our choice of focusing on the urban labor force. Furthermore, the
more educated workforce (tertiary education level) follows dynamics that
are less related to the business cycle, so in the following we fill focus on a
comparison between less than secondary and secondary education groups.
To investigate the appearance of added worker effects, we need to focus
in particular on how the participation rate for women changes over time
and in tandem with the loss of job for men. In fact, as figure 2 shows, the
correlation is particularly strong, in particular during periods of crisis.7
Figure 2: Male unemployment rate (black dashed, left axis) and female
participation rate (light continuous, right axis).Urban workers, four quarter
moving averages.
The other main feature of women participation rates is its strong depen-
dence on educational levels (see figure 3. The added worker effect is more
6The slow real wage recovery can be attributed to several institutional factors likely
to depress real wages, like the high share of informal sector, the low coverage of collective
bargaining (Ilkkaracan, 2005. See also footnote 4) and the absence of an unemployment
benefit system. The latter is related to a large empirical literature concerning the wage-
unemployment relationship (the ”wage curve”). At the micro level, Ilkkaracan and Selim
(2003) shows significant negative correlation between wages and regional unemployment
rates.
7Raw computation shows a correlation coefficient of 0.61 between male unemployment
and female participation one quarter later, that increases to 0.75 if we only consider the
period 2000-2003.
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Figure 3: Urban female labor market evolution, 2000-2010
likely to appear among the less educated women. This is hardly surpris-
ing as in Turkey, as elsewhere, labor-intensive sectors (textiles and apparel)
generally hire low skilled workers (Sugur and Sugur, 2005). In these sectors,
social security coverage is weak and the informalization of labor contracts is
relatively more frequent than in other sectors (Ozdemir, Erel and Yucesan-
Ozdemir, 2004; Ozdemir and Yucesan-Ozdemir, 2004). Furthermore, given
the high correlation of education levels between couples, we can expect par-
ticipation of women to increase more for the lower (i.e. less than secondary)
educated (who belong to households where the man, also non educated lost
his job with a higher probability). Finally, the lower education level segment
generally has a very low participation rate, which implies that the added
worker effect is more likely. Second, that segment covers about 45% of total
female labor force. Yet, almost 400,000 women (panel (a))within this seg-
ment moved into the labor market between 2001Q2 and 2002Q3, about 62%
of the total inflow8. Panel (c) shows furthermore that fluctuations of the
lower educated segment (dark dashed line) are more important in periods of
crisis (2001-03, and even more so in 2009-10). The figure clearly shows that
starting from the first quarter of 2001 the participation rate of less educated
women increases substantially more than for the other education groups 9.
Participation of the lower education segments also reacted more strongly in
periods of recovery (2004-05). This can be attributed to a growth effect: en-
8Gursel and Levent (2003) find similar compositional change but their data disaggre-
gation is based on agricultural- non-agricultural, rather than urban-rural dissection.
9Among men, the least educated group lost around 500.000 jobs at the first quarter of
2002 compared to both secondary and tertiary education level
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couraged by higher employment rates, some of the discouraged workers have
moved back into the labor force. The difference in participation between ed-
ucation groups is mostly due to flows into employment (panel (d)). In fact,
the ratio of unemployed in the two groups remained roughly constant, and
the fluctuations in the labor force were mostly due to employment. This
confirms the idea that the flows are mostly to be explained by the added
worker effect.
We trace the same pattern of added worker effect in the aftermath of
2008 crisis. The employment ratio started increasing at mid-2008. The
negative correlation between man unemployment and women participation
reveals that the buffer labor supply hypothesis still holds. Contrary to the
2001 crisis, this time the unemployment ratio increased (panel (d)), showing
that the lower educated segments has suffered from severe job loss more
pronounced that in 2001. This might be due to the fact that exchange rate
depreciation and strong foreign demand quickly supported the economy in
2001, but and much less so during the global crisis of 2009, when the burden
had to be carried by domestic fiscal policy.
To conclude, a broad and aggregated look at female participation rates
in the period following the crisis of 2001 and 2008 suggests the existence
of an added worker effect: when the economy experienced a negative shock
women with low education levels moved into the labor force most of them as
being employed, and some as job seekers. This effect progressively becomes
less important as the economy starts to recover. After presenting a simple
model relating labor supply for low skilled workers to adverse macroeco-
nomic shocks, we will turn to a more detailed empirical analysis, to try to
disentangle the causes of the added worker effect that broadly emerged from
the aggregated analysis of this section.
3 The Model
In this section, we present a static toy model that shows in a very simple
setting how the introduction of subsistence consumption (minimum con-
sumption constraints), may yield a negatively sloped labor supply curve.
Decreasing labour supply is a rather standard outcome, as it appears when-
ever, in the utility of households, the income effect dominates the substitu-
tion effect. In our model, nevertheless, the slope of the function is not linked
to the characteristics of utility, but to the existence of a constraint that pre-
vents the household from optimally allocating its time between leisure and
consumption.
Households Our economy has 2 households indexed by i, which have
different skills (productivity). One household is (l)ow skilled, the other
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(h)igh skilled, so that i = l, h. Each household has a standard utility func-
tion, with preferences over consumption and leisure. We introduce only one
simple modification to this standard setting by supposing that household
consumption has to be larger than a subsistency level γ. In the absence of
non-wage income, this minimum consumption level γ may be a constraint
over the choice of time allocation between leisure and consumption. The
government taxes (τi > 0) or subsidizes (τi < 0) each type of worker.
Households have a labor endowment n > 1, and maximize utility in
consumption of a numeraire good, c (p = 1), and in leisure, ` ≡ n− l, where
l represents labor supply:
maxui(ci, n− li)
s.t
ci = wi(1− τi)li
ci ≥ γ
Assuming a simple Cobb-Douglas utility function for households,
ui = a ln(ci) + (1− a) ln(n− li),
we can build the Lagrangian as
L = a ln(ci) + (1− a) ln(n− li) + λ(ci − wi(1− τi)li)) + µ(ci − γ).
The solution for non-constrained households is straightforward
ci = wi(1− τi)an ≥ γ
lsi = an (1)
`i = (1− a)n
Thus, all the households for which wi(1 − τi) ≥ γ/an will actually choose
the optimal allocation of leisure and consumption. The constrained workers
(wi(1 − τi) < γ/an), on the other hand, will have to work more than what
they actually desire:
ci = γ
lsi =
γ
wi(1− τi) (2)
`i = n− γ
wi(1− τi)
Consequently, labor supply does not depend on the wage in one region of
the plane, and is negatively sloped in another10. Figure 4 illustrates labor
supply of individual households under minimum consumption constraint.
10A less well behaved utility function (e.g. ui = ci − 12a l2i ) would yield a more general,
u-shaped labor supply curve. As we are interested in the decreasing portion of the curve,
we decided to keep an analytically more convenient formulation.
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Figure 4: Labor supply for constrained (wi(1 − τi) < γ/an) and uncon-
strained households. The parameter values for this numerical example are
γ = 5, n = 4, a = 0.35, τi = 0.
The Firm Problem A representative firm under perfect competition
minimizes costs:
minC(y, wl, wh) = whlh + wlll
s.t.
y = Alαh l
1−α
l
where i = h, l is skill. Thus, production requires both high and low skill
labor. The skill level is reflected in the coefficient α, that we assume to be
larger than 1/2 : α ∈ (12 , 1). Minimization of the cost function yields
Alα−1h αl
1−α
l = wh
Alαh l
−α
l (1− α) = wl
Labour demand can be written as
ldl = yA
−1
(
α
1− α
wl
wh
)α−1
(3)
ldh = yA
−1
(
α
1− α
wl
wh
)α
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The Benchmark Case In equilibrium aggregate demand (equation
1) will be equal to supply. Furthermore, labor demand and supply must be
equal. This gives, when households are not constrained,
Alαh l
1−α
l = y = an(wl(1− τl) + wh(1− τh))
ldl = yA
−1
(
1− α
α
wh
wl
)1−α
= an
ldh = yA
−1
(
α
1− α
wl
wh
)α
= an
We can then derive wages,
w∗h =
αA
(1− τl)(1− α) + (1− τh)α
w∗l =
(1− α)A
(1− τl)(1− α) + (1− τh)α,
and the equilibrium wage ratio (where equilibrium is denoted by a star):
ρ∗ ≡ w
∗
h
w∗l
=
α
1− α > 1
c∗h
c∗l
=
wh(1− τh)an
wl(1− τl)an =
α
1− α
(1− τh)
(1− τl)
To conclude, in the benchmark the wage ratio and consumption ratio
only depend on technical coefficients α. Thus an aggregate shock, be it
negative or positive, will not affect the relative wealth of the two groups.
Total productivity A is the exogenous variable we chose to shock the
economy. Notice first of all that we can compute a threshold A¯, above
which no household will be constrained. As wh > wl, the threshold can
be computed as the value of A for which the consumption of low skilled
households is equal to γ.
cl = an(1− τl)wl = an(1− τl)(1− α)A
(1− τl)(1− α) + (1− τh)α = γ.
This yields
A¯ =
(1− τh)α+ (1− τl)(1− α)
(1− τl)(1− α)
γ
an
If A < A¯, then the low skilled workers will be constrained, as their wage
will not be high enough to guarantee cl ≥ γ. In that case we are in the
subsistence case.
11
The Subsistence Case Let us assume that A < A¯. This introduces
a constraint for the low skilled workers. Labor demand is still given by eq.
(3), but labor supply for the low skilled households and aggregate demand
now are different (see eq. 2). Equilibrium in the good market is given by
cl + ch = γ + anwh(1− τh) = y
and as a consequence, the equilibrium in the two labor markets can be
written as:
(γ + anwh(1− τh))A−1
(
1− α
α
wh
wl
)1−α
=
γ
wl(1− τl)
(γ + anwh(1− τh))A−1
(
α
1− α
wl
wh
)α
= an
From this we can compute the wages
wh =
γ
(1− τl) an
α
1− α (4a)
wl =
(
Aan (1− α) (1− τl)
((1− α) (1− τl) + α(1− τh)) γ
)1/α γ
(1− τl) an (4b)
Notice that now wh does not depend on A. The wage gap ρ =
wh
wl
is
ρ =
(
γ
an
(
1 +
α(1− τh)
(1− α) (1− τl)
))1/α α
1− αA
−1/α, (5)
and it is negatively related to A :
∂ρ
∂A
= −
(
γ
an
(
1 +
α(1− τh)
(1− α) (1− τl)
))1/α A− 1+αα
1− α < 0
Thus, a general reduction in the productivity level (a decrease in A) will
have the effect of increasing the wage spread.
Plugging the expressions for wages 4a and 4b in equations 1 and 2, and
in the absence of any redistribution policy (τl = τh = 0), we obtain
ch = γ
α
1− α lh = an
cl = γ ll =
(
γ
Aan (1− α)
)1/α
an
Notice that here we implicitly assume that the low skilled household has
enough endowment of time, to be able to consume γ, i.e. that n−
(
γ
Aan(1−α)
)1/α
an ≥
0. Rewriting in terms of A, then we obtain the lower bound for the overall
productivity:
A > A =
γaα
an (1− α)
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With τi = 0, the threshold at which the low skilled are constrained is
A < A¯ =
γ
an(1− α)
As a consequence, the range of A values for which low skilled households
are constrained but can still consume γ is A ∈ [A, A¯]. Figure (5) shows the
behavior of consumption and labor supply for different values of A. The
Figure 5: Consumption (black) and labor supply (gray) for high (dashed)
and low (solid) skilled households. The parameter values are α = 0.75,
τi = 0, a = 0.35, n = 4, γ = 5.
high skilled household supplies a constant amount of labor (dashed gray
line), while below A¯ the low skilled is forced to supply more. Notice finally
that the constraints on the low skilled force him to consume cl = γ, but also
affect the high skilled (black dashed and solid lines respectively)
We also compute aggregate welfare, defined as the sum of the two house-
hold’s utilities (the representative firm does not make any profits). Absent
government intervention (τi = 0), welfare is
Uτ=0 = a ln(γ)+a ln
(
γα
1−α
)
+(1−a) ln(n−
(
γ
Aan(1−α)
)1/α
an)+(1−a) ln(n−an)
(6)
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3.1 Tax Policy and Welfare
Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the government has no other role
in the economy than redistribution, implying that the pre-crisis level of
taxation is τl,t−1 = τh,t−1 = 0. (we add a subscript t because taxation
changes from before to after the crisis). We also assume that the government
faces a balanced budget constraint.
The government objective is to restore, through taxation, the pre-crisis
wage gap ρ∗ = α/(1− α), i.e., it sets solves
ρ =
(
γ
anA
(
1 +
α(1− τh,t)
(1− α) (1− τl,t)
))1/α α
1− α =
α
1− α = ρ
∗
wl,t−1ll,tτl,t−1 + wh,t−1lh,t−1τh,t−1 = wl,tll,tτl,t + wh,tlh,tτh,t = 0
From the first equation, we have
γ
anA
(
1 +
α(1− τh,t)
(1− α) (1− τl,t)
)
= 1
while from the second, substituting, we have
wl,t
(
1− α
α
wh,t
wl,t
)1−α
τl,t = −wh,t
(
α
1− α
wl,t
wh,t
)α
τh,t
⇒ (1− α) τl,t = −ατh,t
Thus, we can compute the tax rates that bring the wage gap ρ to its pre-crisis
level
τh,t =
γ − (1− α)anA
αanA
τl,t = −γ − (1− α)anA
(1− α) anA ,
and the corresponding consumption levels:
cl = γ ch = anA− γ
ll = lh = an.
Thus, the after subsidies wage for the low skilled household is precisely
what is needed to make it supply the amount of labor it would in absence
of constraints. Uτ 6=0 denotes aggregate welfare in the case of government
intervention:
Uτ 6=0 = a ln(γ) + a ln(anA− γ) + 2(1− a) ln(n− an) (7)
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We can then compute the change in aggregate welfare with government
intervention as
Ω = Uτ 6=0 − Uτ=0
= a ln(anA− γ) + (1− a) ln (n(1− a))−
− a ln
(
γα
1− α
)
− (1− a) ln
(
n−
(
γ
Aan (1− α)
)1/α
an
)
When we impose taxation we have an increase in welfare for the low
skilled household (because it works less), but a decrease in welfare for the
high skilled (because for the same amount of work, it consumes less). The
following proposition states that in a neighborhood of A¯ the net effect is
positive, (Ω = Uτ 6=0−Uτ=0 > 0), so that imposing taxes and subsidies, even
if distortionary, allows an overall increase in welfare.
Proposition 1 The welfare with taxation is larger (Uτ 6=0 − Uτ=0 > 0) in a
neighborhood of A¯
Proof. First, remark that: Uτ 6=0 − Uτ=0|A=A¯ = 0. This is of course true,
because at A = A¯ the subsidy is zero. Then, compute ∂Ω∂A
∂Ω
∂A
=
∂(a ln(anA− γ))
∂A
− ∂
(
(1− a) ln(n− (Aan)−1/α(1− α)−1/αγ1/αan))
∂A
=
a2n
Aan− γ +
(1− α)−1/αγ1/αa (1− a)
Aα((1− α)−1/αγ1/αa− (Aan)1/α)
If we evaluate it at A = A¯, we have
∂Ω
∂A
∣∣∣∣
A=A¯
= a2
n(1− α)
αγ
− a2n (1− α)
αγ
= 0
Thus we know that A = A¯ is a local extreme. We can then take the second
derivative:
∂2Ω
∂A2
=
∂
(
a2n
Aan−γ
)
∂A
+
∂
(
X(1−a)
Aα(X−(Aan)1/α)
)
∂A
where X = (1−α)−1/αγ1/αa collects some terms not depending on A. If we
evaluate it at A = A¯, we find
∂2Ω
∂A2
∣∣∣∣
A=A¯
=
a3n2 (α− 1)2 (a+ α(1− a))
α2γ2 (1− a) > 0
which implies that A¯ is a minimum, and that Ω = Uτ 6=0 − Uτ=0 > 0 in its
neighborhood.
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In our model, the minimum consumption constraint modifies labor sup-
ply decision of low-skilled household, resulting in additional labor inflows
to labor market. The added worker (labor) effect leads to a countercyclical
wage gap (eq. 5). This is simply a result of asymmetric effects of pro-
ductivity shocks (falling below the threshold A¯) over the labor-consumption
decisions of unskilled and skilled workers. The change of the wage gap is thus
temporary, and as the economy starts to recover, it returns to its pre-crisis
level.
Starting from the mid-year 2003 up to the end of 2004, we see that
the added workers left the labor market (figure 3). After 2004 we observe
strong employment growth for all education levels. It has to be noted in
conjunction that real wages started to recover (though slowly) by 2004. In
accordance with the implications of the model, we observe a countercyclical
wage gap in Turkey. Using the education level as a proxy for skill, we
grouped female wage earners with respect to their educational attainment.
In order to be consistent with the educational split for participation rates,
we calculated average hourly wages for urban male and female workers for
3 different education level. Table 1 shows average hourly wages and wage
ratios among these sub-groups. Compared to the year 2002, when there is
strong added worker effect, the wage gap among different skill levels has
narrowed in the post-crisis period. This is true for all sub-groups and it
implies that the twin-crisis in 2001 has produced asymmetric effects on the
wage formation of different skill groups.
4 The Empirical Model
The theoretical model described above assumes the participation decision
to be a household decision which can be regarded as a reallocation of mar-
ketable labor. However, the participation decision is in fact twofold. It can
either be considered as an individual choice, more or less strictly related to
individual human capital, or as a collective choice, resulting from the divi-
sion of labor within the household. The family characteristics such as family
income and composition or the labor market status and job earnings of fam-
ily members are important factors in the participation decision of married
women. The individual human capital determines the wage level in the labor
market. Family related factors complement the participation decision along
with a change in the marketable work sharing inside the household. The
empirical model must take into account both the individual and household
determinants of labor force participation decisions.
We use the same methodology used in Bas¸levent and Onaran (2003)
which estimates a bivariate choice model of married couples to analyze the
added worker effect in 1988 and 1994. Instead of focusing solely on the labor
market participation of married women, we prefer to use a bivariate probit
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model which helps capturing the collective response of the household. One
of the outcome equations estimates the employment status of the husband
taking the value of 1 if he is employed and 0 when he is unemployed. The
other equation estimates the participation of the spouse taking the value of
1 if she participates, 0 when she is does not. The statistically significant
correlation between these two equations shows that the labor market deci-
sions of married couples are correlated and thus reflects the collective labor
sharing within the household. If the correlation coefficient is negative and
statistically significant, the model implies that households receiving nega-
tive employment shocks do reallocate their collective labor supply in order
to mitigate the negative effect. The inactive wife will enter into the labor
market if the household suffers from a serious income loss resulting from
unemployment of the husband. In this sense, the model only partially cap-
tures the added worker effect, as it does overlooks wage cuts, and/or cases
in which the household is not dependent only on the wage-income but rather
have a composition of non-labor earnings. We do not a have a panel data
which will enable to capture the wage cuts of husbands during the 2001-
2002 period. Nevertheless, we can include the non-labor earnings that will,
among other things, serve as cushion vis-a-vis an idiosyncratic shock in
the absence of unemployment benefits. For the estimation of the bivariate
model we used the Household Budget Surveys conducted by TURKSTAT
between 2002 and 2008, even if we only report the data for the post-crisis
period (2002-2005). The budget surveys include, beside labor market status
of couples, the annual non-wage income of the households which can provide
control variables at least for one of the important caveats of the bivariate
model. The sample we retained only includes the married couples with wives
aging between 24-49 and husbands aging between 24-54. Non-participant
husbands are excluded from the sample since their inclusion may cause mis-
specifications related to early retirement and various other reasons. The two
equation binary choice model relating the employment status of the husband
( denoted by e1 = 1 if employed, zero if not) and the participation of the
wife (denoted by p2 = 1 if she participates, zero if she does not) can be
written as
e∗1 = β
′
1xc + γ
′
1xm + µ1 with e1 = 1 if e
∗
1 > 0, 0 otherwise,
p∗2 = β
′
2xc + γ
′
2xm + µ2 with p2 = 1 if p
∗
2 > 0, 0 otherwise,
where e∗1 and p∗2 are the latent variables of the two outcome equations and
where the µ′s are zero mean random disturbances jointly normally dis-
tributed, with the correlation coefficient denoted by ρ. The non-observable
part of the collective decision may be explained through the residual co-
variance structure. A residual covariance significantly different from zero
may serve as an indicator of unobserved dependency between the two labor
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market statuses of the household. In other words, if ρ is significantly differ-
ent from zero, then the two labor market responses depend on the common
unobserved disturbance, and the likeliness of the husband being employed is
correlated with the likeliness of the wife being participant. The added worker
effect would require the correlation, i.e. ρ, to be negative and significant:
the job loss of husbands needs to be correlated with the increased partic-
ipation of wives. Notice that this empirical model only allows to capture
the endogeneity of these two responses, without expliciting any direction of
causality. To establish such a link, we would have to better relate the timing
of the job loss and participation decisions, something that the nature of the
sample does not allow11.
xc is the vector of common covariates of the household, that contains for
husband and wife respectively, age, a no schooling dummy, primary educa-
tion level, secondary education level,tertiary education level; furthermore,
for the household as a whole xc contains the number of children of age less
than 2, between 2 and 5, and between 6 and 15 respectively. We have four
model specifications, each including the common covariates of xc but differ-
ing according to the inclusion of non-wage income of the household (in the
vector xm). The content of xm for the different models is summarized in
table 2. Model 1 excludes the non-wage income whereas models 2, 3 and
4 include non-wage income with different combinations. Model 2 includes
the pooled non-wage income of the couple, to address the wealth level ef-
fect of the household in line with the unitary family (collective) model of
the household. Unitary models assume that resources are pooled within the
household and the choice of couples related to labor sharing depends on
prices, wages and total wealth. In contrast to collective decision models,
some models assume that individual labor supply behavior of couples is dif-
ferentially affected by their own sources of income, (Lundberg and Pollak
1994; Blau and Kahn 2007). We include the non-wage incomes separately to
capture what is known in the literature as the bargaining effect within the
household (model 3). If both are significant in the participation equation,
this means that the secondary member (the wife) has some bargaining power
with respect to labor sharing within the household. In our set-up, the bar-
gaining pattern (in model 3) does not totally rule out the unitary model but
it complements the unitary model by expliciting the effect of the bargaining
power of spouses on the collective decision, since the idiosyncratic shock is
absorbed in a collective manner (the case where correlation coefficient ρ is
negative and significant). Finally, we suppose that the wage-dependency ef-
fect can be captured with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
household has a positive non-wage income and takes 0 if it does not receive
any non-wage income (model 4). The wage-dependency effect is the most
11We would need at least quarterly (if not monthly) surveys, and the possibility of
tracking individual households over time.
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relevant to our theoretical model. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of
the data used for the estimations.
4.1 Results
Table 4 reports the results of our estimation. We have several relevant re-
sults, consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. The main
result is that the correlation coefficient ρ is negative and significant for the
post-crisis period 2002-2004. This reveals that the labor market outcomes of
married couples are related and that participation is the result of a collective
decision within the household. The correlation coefficient ρ turns insignifi-
cant in 2005, implying that the effect of the crisis is over by then and shocks
at the household level are absorbed by other means than buffer labor sup-
ply. The negative sign of the correlation coefficient between 2002 and 2004
is robust, as it remains significant under various model specifications.
A second result of the estimation is that the participation decision of
wives is positively related to their own non-wage income and negatively
linked to non-wage income of their partners12. This finding is evidence in
support of a bargaining effect on the collective decision within the household,
in the sense that the dependency of participation decisions of wives from
husband unemployment is conditional on the their own non-wage income.
Finally, household non-wage income does affect the participation decision
of wives. This happens through two channels: if wage-income is the sole
income source of the husband, the negative shock in the employment status
of husband increases the probability of the wives to participate. In model 4,
the dummy variable taking the value of one in presence of non-wage income
(for either wife or husband or both) can be interpreted in this vein. In the
post-crisis years 2002-2003, this dummy variable is negative and significant
for the wives. It means that for the households in which husbands have no
non-wage income (or whose only income source is paid jobs) some kind of
added worker effect (or increased labor supply) is in play. In other words,
the dependency to wage income for husbands increases the likeliness of wives
to participate, but just for the post-crisis years 2002-2003. For other years,
this effect is positive and it turns to be insignificant for the year 2005.
The other factors which are mostly related to household composition have
the expected signs, already highlighted by other studies (see Baslevent and
Onaran, 2003; Tunali and Baslevent, 2006). The estimations show that as
the number of children attending school decreases, it becomes more likely
that female members of the household to participate into labor market.
This supports the claim that the poor child care facilities contribute to keep
12We do not compute marginal effects, because we are not interested in the relative
contribution of the different explanatory variables, but rather on their sign, and above all,
in the sign of coefficient ρ.
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women out of the labor market13.
We can summarize our major empirical findings relevant to the theo-
retical model. Firstly, the effect of 2001 crisis has lasted until 2005 and
has affected the labor market outcomes of the households who received a
negative employment shock. The dependency on husband’s wage-income
increases the likeliness of wives to participate as a buffer labor supply in the
presence of job losses. This dependency effect is significant and positive for
the years 2002 and 2003. By the year 2005, the coefficient of correlation is
still negative but it turns to be insignificant. This confirms that the added
worker effect is a typical crisis phenomenon.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the behavior of labor markets in situation of crisis.
The supply side of labor markets can be an important aspect in explaining
aggregate employment patterns. We investigated the effects of minimum
consumption constraints over labor supply decisions of low-skilled work-
ers when a severe negative shock hits the economy. Within the context of
a very simple static general equilibrium model, the minimum consumption
constraint modifies labor supply decisions of unskilled households trigger-
ing the well-known added worker effect. Additional inflows of low-skilled
(female) workers in to the labor market lead to asymmetric effects on equi-
librium wages producing a countercyclical wage gap, and a welfare loss for
unskilled households. We tried to compare the results of the model with
an empirical analysis of the factors affecting the participation of new en-
trants in the labor market between 2000 and 2006. Factors like job-loss and
income-loss both heavily increase the likeliness of an additional worker in the
household. Household attributes in the estimations capture the interaction
between labor market decisions and the socio-economic environment.
The crisis that unfolds while we write is likely to yield similar outcomes.
Figure 6, inspired by Eichengreen, and O’Rourke (2009), compares the un-
folding of the 2001 twin crisis and of the 2008 global crisis. Taking the peak
as equal to 100 (November 2000 and May 2008 for the two crises respec-
tively, meaning that the end period is December 2002 and August 2010), it
compares a set of key indicators to assess the relative severity of the two
crises. The picture that emerges from the figure is rather clear. The early
stages of the crisis were more severe in 2008 than in 2001. While less sud-
den, the drop in industrial production has been more pronounced in the
first half of 2009 than it was in 2001-2002; the same can be said for the
increase of unemployment (for which comparisons can be carried out only
with quarterly data), while the stock market correction was similar in the
13There is a vast literature on child-care costs and female labor participation; see Blau
and Robins (1988), and for Turkey World Bank (2006).
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Figure 6: Comparison of the 2001 twin crisis (gray; peak: November 2000)
with the 2008 global crisis (black; peak: May 2008). Our calculations
two cases. The peculiar (exchange rate) nature of the 2001 crisis emerges
from the third quadrant, showing a much more marked depreciation than
it is the case today. That depreciation allowed Turkey to export its way
out of a crisis that remained substantially local. Today, in the context of a
global crisis, exports are stagnating. In the second part of the period there
is convergence in the data, with industrial production that remains never-
theless more volatile now than it was in 2002. The only major differences
pertain to the exchange rate, that remains stable today (also thanks to the
weakness of the dollar), and to the stock market, that sees a spectacular
increase than we did not observe in 2002. To conclude, also considering the
international environment and the tensions in the exchange rate markets,
we can safely forecast a long and severe crisis today, at least of the same
magnitude than we saw in 2001. The effects of the crisis on unemployment
will also likely be extremely severe (also considering that we started in 2008
with a much higher unemployment rate than in 2001). Therefore, we can
forecast an increased pressure on the poorest household to increase their
supply of labor in the attempt to sustain their revenues.
As our model shows, albeit in a very simplified setting, appropriate gov-
ernment intervention, in the form of redistributive taxation, can reduce the
impact of negative aggregate shocks, and improve aggregate welfare. Today,
even more than in 2001, wage taxation becomes an instrument for social
risk sharing, preventing the heavy burden of economic crisis to fall dispro-
portionately on the shoulders of less qualified households.
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Table 2: Content of the vector xm in the 4 empirical models
Pooled Husband Wife Husband Wife
non-wage non-wage non-wage non-wage non-wage
income income income income dummy income dummy
Model 1 - - - - -
Model 2 x - - - -
Model 3 - x x - -
Model 4 - - - x x
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